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Executive Summary
This paper argues that due to two unstoppable mechanisms, some of 
the most pressing future questions in health policy will relate to the 
use of digital technologies to analyze data concerning patient health. 
The fi rst mechanism is the shift away from a system where patient 
data was essentially temporary and not intended to be reused or eas-
ily accessed again, to a new digital world where patient data is easily 
transferred and accessed repeatedly. The second mechanism is a funda-
mental deepening of the nature of patient data that enables increased 
personalization of health care for each individual patient, based on not 
only their detailed medical history, but also their likely future medical 
history that can be projected for their genetic makeup. We summarize 
our research investigating the potential consequences of policies in this 
new world where patient data is virtually costless to store, share, and 
individualize. We emphasize that issues of data management and pri-
vacy are now at the forefront of health policy considerations.
Digital data and digital technologies have the potential to transform 
medicine through two mechanisms. First, digital patient data is far eas-
ier to share and access than traditional paper records. This has many 
potential upsides, but also raises the question of how the potential ben-
efi ts of sharing patient data are moderated by privacy concerns. Second, 
the advent of digital storage has now made it possible to store, virtually 
costlessly, vast swathes of data about any one individual patient. Such 
individualized data also enables a patient-centric approach to medicine, 
often referred to as “personalized” or “precision” medicine, based on 
that individual patient’s genetic makeup.
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This article discusses the potential benefi ts and possible policy con-
sequences of this digital shift. It emphasizes that the benefi ts of digital 
technologies are found when data is actually transferred and repeat-
edly accessed. This emphasizes that policies that wish to encourage the 
potential upside of digital technologies should emphasize easy data 
transfer. Empirical evidence suggests that  health- care providers may 
not individually have the right incentives to share data, and therefore if 
a policy aims to encourage data transfer it needs to not only subsidize 
the adoption of digital technologies, but also make sure that there are 
the right incentives to use these technologies to share data. Often, well- 
meaning policies toward data security and data privacy can hamper 
this process. This article also suggests that there are distinct concerns 
related to the deepening and individualizing of data that is associated 
with personalized medicine, and that while there is potentially a large 
upside in terms of medical outcomes, the risks associated with this data 
are unusual. If policymakers seek to encourage personalized medicine, 
they might be especially successful to employ an approach to data man-
agement that gives control of the use of the data to the patient.
I.  Potential Positive Consequences of Easy Transfer of and Access 
to Digital Medical Records
A. Effects on Health Outcomes
The theoretical foundation for why health care information technology 
(IT) or digital patient record keeping may improve the quality of care 
has been developed in many scholarly and popular articles, such as 
Brailer (2005) and Hillestad et al. (2005). Improvements may stem from 
reduced error rates, especially from drug interactions, as well as im-
proved patient monitoring.1
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that this digital shift toward 
health care IT is a consequence of a combination of complementary 
factors. Specifi cally, the digitization of medical records, which allows 
them to be both be reused and be more comprehensive, relies on three 
complementary trends: the emergence of EMR software, the declining 
cost of storage and personal computers, and the increased technologi-
cal sophistication of doctors raised in a generation where computer use 
was commonplace. Though by themselves none of these trends appears 
profound, in combination we argue that they will profoundly shift the 
policy agenda in health care.
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In this chapter, we want to emphasize that there is a theoretical dis-
tinction between the internal benefi ts of health care IT use at a particu-
lar clinical encounter and the broader benefi ts of being able to share 
data created by digital technologies. The existing literature suggests 
that the positive effects of health IT are most likely to occur where there 
is a compelling need for both data sharing and the rapid access features 
of digital health information.
To show this, we start off with a detailed description of our own work 
in the area. Miller and Tucker (2011a) studied the adoption of electronic 
medical records (EMRs) across twelve years of data.2 We related the 
level of adoption of electronic medical records with neonatal mortality 
in that county. Overall, we found that a 10% increase in births that oc-
cur in hospitals with EMRs reduced neonatal mortality by 16 deaths per 
100,000 live births. This is important because each year 18,000 babies 
die in the United States within their fi rst 28 days of life. This high rate 
of neonatal mortality means that the United States is currently ranked 
44th in the world, comparably with Macedonia and Qatar, and behind 
24 of the 27 members of the European Union (World Bank 2015). Rough 
cost- effectiveness calculations suggest that EMRs are associated with a 
cost of $531,000 per baby’s life saved.
Though these headline fi gures are informative for the overall effects 
on neonatal mortality, from a  forward- looking policy perspective it is 
also useful to consider the specifi c cases we identifi ed where health IT 
lead to improvements in neonatal mortality and those where it did not. 
We found that the majority of births were not affected by health care 
IT. Instead, it was the high- risk cases that required intervention from 
specialists in  maternal- fetal medicine that drove the reduction we saw 
in the data. It was the cases in particular where the mother had a pre-
existing condition that were aided by technology. We did not see ben-
efi ts in cases where technology could offer little help because the reason 
the birth was high risk was due to a chromosomal or genetic defect.
One example of the kinds of cases where outcomes were particularly 
enhanced from the adoption of health care IT were conditions associ-
ated with the placenta. A classic example is a condition like placenta 
previa, which is described by Iyasu et al. (1993) as something that can 
cause “serious, occasionally fatal complications for fetuses and moth-
ers,” and that had outcomes that were particularly positively affected 
by the adoption of health care IT. Placenta previa occurs when a baby’s 
placenta partially or totally covers a mother’s cervix. It is also detect-
able prior to birth through an ultrasound. While it can be successfully 
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managed through a caesarian section, it is a condition that requires a 
great deal of care and planning regarding how the mother’s labor is 
managed. Such conditions make it clear why health care IT can poten-
tially improve outcomes. It is not the simple effi ciency or reduction in 
error keeping associated with digital technologies and the storage of 
data that explains the improvement. Instead, it is the ability to share 
the data from the ultrasound to other  health- care providers quickly and 
seamlessly, and at the point a mother enters labor. We also showed that 
there were additional benefi ts from incremental digital technologies 
that go beyond a typical digital medical records system and instead 
enhance the system with  obstetric- specifi c technologies, digital technol-
ogy, and decision support.
The other factor we found that was important for explaining when 
health care IT was successful was the likelihood of the mother to suc-
cessfully advocate for herself in a  health- care setting. We found little 
improvement for birth outcomes for mothers who were well educated, 
white, and who could speak English well. Instead, the biggest improve-
ment in outcomes was focused on the less educated, those for whom 
English was not their fi rst language, and historically racially disadvan-
taged groups. This is an important fi nding. Often technologies have 
been found to aggravate existing disparities (Acemoglu 2003). How-
ever, this appeared to be an example of a new technology where in-
equality in outcomes were reduced. A potential mechanism for this ef-
fect is that white, highly educated mothers for whom English was their 
fi rst language may have found it easy to communicate any preexisting 
conditions or other considerations that might affect the nature of the 
delivery and birth. However, members of groups for whom commu-
nication was either hampered by language or potentially unconscious 
biases within the medical profession (Schulman et al. 1999) were helped 
by the presence and sharing of an existing digital record, which did not 
require their individual communication with the medical team.
We want to emphasize that this paper was just part of a growing 
literature that attempts to understand in which settings health care IT 
improves  health- quality outcomes. Large national studies have related 
hospitals’ adoption of electronic medical records (EMRs) and other 
forms of health IT to  higher- quality care, measured by process improve-
ments and lower mortality. Some of this work suggests that there is little 
positive effect—for example, Agha (2014) found little effect on mortal-
ity, adverse drug events, or readmission rates using Medicare patients. 
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Similarly, Spetz, Burgess, and Phibbs (2014) found little positive effects 
on  nursing- sensitive outcomes using Veterans Administration data.
However, there are some more positive fi ndings such as McCullough, 
Parente, and Town (2013), who fi nd that benefi ts to electronic patient 
data tend to occur only in settings where there is a severe case mix, 
or in other words, very sick patients. They emphasize that “benefi ts 
from health IT are primarily experienced by patients whose diagnoses 
require  cross- specialty care coordination and extensive clinical informa-
tion management.” Freedman, Lin, and Prince (2014) fi nd some positive 
effects from the adoption of Computerized Physician Order Entry ap-
plications on a nonsenior population in terms of decreasing preventable 
adverse effects. Work such as Gresenz et al. (2016) has also expanded 
the literature and shows reductions in ambulatory care- sensitive hos-
pitalizations in ambulatory centers that have adopted digital technol-
ogies. One potential explanation for the mixed outcomes of these stud-
ies is provided by Lin, Lin, and Chen (2014), who fi nd that adoption of 
digital technologies does not often equate to their practical use. They 
fi nd evidence that if one focuses on meaningful use rather than simply 
adoption, there is a positive effect in particular for small, nonteaching, 
or rural hospitals—in other words, the kind of hospitals that have his-
torically been isolated from technology and where the benefi ts of data 
sharing may be most profound.
Taken together, the literature emphasizes that by itself health care 
IT cannot be presumed to automatically improve health outcomes. In-
stead, there needs to be a compelling case that the sharing of, coor-
dination across, and easy access to data may prove benefi cial in that 
particular health circumstance.
B. Effects on Costs
Sharing patient data may also help avoid unnecessary costs. An obvi-
ous potential example of cost reduction is avoiding duplicative test-
ing. Lammers, Adler- Milstein, and Kocher (2014) show that the use of 
repeat CT scans, chest X- rays, and ultrasound scans was signifi cantly 
lower when patients had both their emergency visits at two unaffi liated 
hospitals that took part in a health information exchange. Specifi cally, 
they found evidence that patients were 59% less likely to have a redun-
dant CT scan, 44% less likely to get a redundant ultrasound, and 67% 
less likely to have a redundant chest X- ray when both their emergency 
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visits were at hospitals that shared information with other health pro-
viders across a health information exchange.
Other cost savings stem from lowering administrative costs. Of 
course, such cost savings are traditionally thought to be gained through 
effi ciencies in administration related to a digital, rather than a paper, 
environment. However superfi cially compelling such arguments seem, 
countervailing forces may limit or negate the cost savings associated 
with health care IT. The installation of an IT system may prove unsuc-
cessful if providers and other staff resist changing their work patterns, 
or if they fi nd that the computerization adds to their administrative 
burdens, introduces redundancy to documentation procedures, or is 
cumbersome to use.
Given that it is not theoretically clear whether IT will by itself reduce 
costs, it is perhaps not surprising that a simple attempt to correlate the 
adoption of digital technologies with the operating costs reported by 
hospitals in the annual American Hospital Association survey suggests, 
if anything, that there is a marginal increase in costs associated with 
the adoption of electronic health records, as documented by both Agha 
(2014) and Dranove et al. (2014). Dranove et al. (2014) also provide a 
potential answer as to why the cost savings of such technologies have 
been less than hoped for. In particular, they explore how operating costs 
change over time after adoption. They show that it is only hospitals in 
locations where there is a local labor market focused on IT that experi-
ence in a decrease in costs after three years. Other hospitals still face 
slightly higher costs after six years. This provides suggestive evidence 
that, by itself, digitization does not reduce costs. Instead, it has to be 
introduced in an organization with the capacity to ensure that the IT 
enhances rather than interferes with existing work patterns.
Taken together these two papers suggest that cost savings from digi-
tal technologies are more likely to come from increased data sharing 
rather than simple administrative effi ciency.
II.  Potential Policy Questions Arising from the Easy Transfer of 
and Access to Digital Medical Records
A. Policies That Enhance Incentives for Data Sharing
Given that there is evidence that the major benefi ts of the switch to digi-
tal technologies are realized when they are used to share data, rather 
than the simple conversion process from paper to digital, it is of ob-
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vious interest to policymakers to consider how to ensure that data is 
shared. Attempts to leverage “big data” in health care beyond the indi-
vidual patient, such as the “learning health” system (Smith et al. 2013), 
will depend crucially on the willingness of providers to share their data 
(Goodby, Olsen, and McGinnis 2010). However, it is unclear what the 
best steps are to ensure that information exchange happens.
One commonly advocated strategy for kick- starting a platform for 
data exchange is to secure a large “marquee” user to help attract other 
users to the platform. As described by Eisenmann, Parker, and Van Al-
styne (2006), “the participation of ‘marquee users’ can be especially im-
portant for attracting participants.” Gowrisankaran and Stavins (2004) 
set out a foundational economic framework for understanding based 
on the concept of network effects where the usefulness of technologies 
increase in the number of users. Due to marquee users’ scale, they can 
internalize some of the network effects inherent in the platform and in 
turn then attract more users to the platform. To see this, consider a net-
work technology that connects multiple separate fi rms. Each fi rm will 
adopt a network technology based on whether it receives net benefi ts 
from being part of the network, but it will not internalize the positive 
effect that its adoption has for other fi rms in the network. If a subset of 
these fi rms merge, then adoption increases, because the newly merged 
fi rm is able to internalize the network benefi ts from adoption at differ-
ent locations.
Given this economic framework, it might be natural to assume that 
as a health policymaker the easiest way of ensuring that data is actually 
shared is by convincing large hospitals and hospital systems to get on 
board and start using health care IT and create patient data. Further-
more, larger hospital systems may be better able to internalize the high 
costs of ensuring compatibility with complex information exchange 
standards, making it cheaper for them to exchange data both internally 
and externally. However, Miller and Tucker (2014a) challenges this in-
tuition. We use data on the exchange of electronic health data within a 
local health area and investigate how the number of hospitals within a 
hospital’s system infl uences its likelihood of sharing data.
We fi nd that hospitals with more hospitals in their system are indeed 
more likely to exchange electronic information internally. However, 
they are less likely to exchange electronic information externally with 
other nearby hospitals. This decision to exchange information exter-
nally does not seem to be driven by the systems’ age or manufacturer, 
nor by the number of other hospitals they could potentially interact 
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with. This contrast between a willingness to share data internally and a 
lack of willingness to share data externally refl ects a tendency for larger 
hospital systems to create “information silos.” An information silo is a 
data system that does not exchange data with other similar systems.
A potential explanation for larger hospital systems’ propensity to cre-
ate information silos is that they fear that by facilitating data outfl ow, 
they may lose patients. If the hospital allows data outfl ow, patients may 
seek more  follow- up care in  stand- alone or community hospitals, which 
may offer more convenience or lower costs to patients whose insurance 
imposes substantial cost sharing (Melnick and Keeler 2007). We offer 
three pieces of evidence, based on estimating heterogeneous effects of 
system size on data exchange, that suggest that strategic motivations 
like these at least partially drive our results.
First, we fi nd a stronger negative relationship between hospital sys-
tem size and external information exchange among hospitals that have 
insurance arrangements that make it easier for patients to leave their 
hospital system. Second, hospitals that pay their staff more are less 
likely to share their data with hospitals outside their system if they are 
part of a larger system. Third, specialty hospitals are less likely to share 
data outside their system if they are part of a larger system. The fi rst 
result suggests that if patients are likely to seek treatment elsewhere, 
hospitals are less likely to share data. The latter two results suggest that 
if hospitals invest valuable resources in patient care, they may also be 
less likely to be willing to share data. While not conclusive, these fi nd-
ings provide some evidence that the creation of information silos that 
we observe is linked to strategic concerns.
The anticipated benefi ts from widespread health IT diffusion, in 
terms of cost savings and improved health outcomes, depend in large 
part on the electronic exchange of patient information. The results of 
this research suggest that adoption of EMR systems alone, even of sys-
tems with the capacity for data sharing, may not be suffi cient to ensure 
that the full value from health IT is realized. This provides a potential 
rationale for public policy specifi cally aimed at promoting the elec-
tronic exchange of clinical information across fi rms and hospital system 
boundaries.
To help coordinate this sharing of data, under current federal policy 
EMRs only qualify for aid if they fulfi ll government criteria for “mean-
ingful use.”3 Currently the “Eligible Hospital and Critical Access Hos-
pital Meaningful Use Core Measure 13” states that to qualify, a hospital 
has to have “performed at least one test of certifi ed EHR technology’s 
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capacity to electronically exchange key clinical information.”4 To qual-
ify, hospitals can simply use information of a fi ctional patient (Wolf, 
Harvell, and Jha 2012). This measure refl ects the current policy focus 
on technological interoperability as being the most important barrier to 
the exchange of  health- care information. However, the kind of seamless 
data sharing we have discussed in terms of the potential cost savings 
and health benefi ts is not aided by policies that can be fulfi lled if a hos-
pital mails a CD- ROM with the patient records stored in pdf format.
This was highlighted in recent testimony by Christine Bechtel to 
the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions on 
June 10, 2015.5 She highlighted that when she requested her medical 
data from her primary care provider in order to share it with other med-
ical providers, she was fi rst told she only could receive a paper copy, 
despite the offi ce having a digital health records system installed. After 
highlighting that legally she was entitled to an electronic copy, since 
they had a certifi ed Electronic Health Records system that had been 
subsidized by the federal government, after more than a week they cre-
ated a fi le on a CD- ROM that she had to physically pick up and was 
only readable with a specialized app.
Our work, together with anecdotes such as this and others included 
in the April 2015 ONC report on “health information blocking,”6 sug-
gest a need for those who aim to ensure the full benefi ts of digital health 
technologies are obtained, also focus on making sure that providers are 
both willing and able to be able to share electronic patient data as well.7
Our results suggest, for those who seek to ensure that electronic in-
formation is actually shared, that a focus on compatibility or capability 
alone will not be enough. To succeed in ensuring comprehensive mean-
ingful use, the federal government will have to address the fact that 
larger hospital systems that may be producing better health outputs 
may also be less willing to exchange information. This reluctance to 
share information may stem from the notion that records are the prop-
erty of the hospital. As quoted in Knox (2009), Dr. Delbanco, a primary 
care specialist at Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center in Boston, states, 
“You can get it [the patient record] [. . .] But we do everything in the 
world to make sure you don’t get it.” The fi ndings of this paper sug-
gest that this ethos may be echoed in the switch from paper to digital 
records.
To summarize, our research highlights that attempts to provide in-
centives for IT adoption may inadvertently also be giving hospitals 
incentives to adopt systems that are incompatible with their ultimate 
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aim of widespread sharing of health information. And this is worrying 
because as we have discussed, it is in the sharing of health information 
that the benefi ts of IT lie.
B. Does Digitization Make It Harder to Secure Data?
We now move from the policy question of how to ensure that data is 
shared to the question of how to ensure that the data is shared only 
with those for whom such sharing is desirable. This discussion draws 
on the fi eld of the economics of information security, which highlights 
that as data is more easily shared in a digital format, it is also more vul-
nerable to access by outsiders who may have malicious purposes such 
as identity theft.
In Miller and Tucker (2011b), we explored whether the digitization 
of health records was correlated with data breaches, that is, the loss 
of data, and whether policies designed to minimize the risk of data 
breaches hurt or helped. A panel data set from 2005 to 2008 allowed 
insight into what fi rm characteristics, legal regulations, and IT protocols 
were correlated with data breaches. We found evidence that, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, when a hospital adopts electronic health records this 
increased the likelihood of a breach. Specifi cally, installation of clini-
cal and fi nancial data warehousing software was associated with an 
increase in customer data loss. In line with the emphasis of Dranove 
et al. (2014), we also found a role for human capital. Having highly paid 
employees was associated with a reduction in the likelihood of data loss 
(especially where fraud was involved).
Surprisingly, we found empirical evidence that the use of encryption 
software does not reduce the instances of data loss. Instead, its installa-
tion was associated with an increase in the likelihood of data loss associ-
ated with fraud and loss of computer equipment. This matters because 
encryption is a policy often emphasized in the world of information 
security. Firms are often encouraged to adopt and use encryption soft-
ware in order to help minimize the risks of losing customer data. En-
cryption is a way to encode computer fi les so that only someone with 
access to a secret “key” can read them. Theoretically, encrypting data 
should deter malicious hackers because it makes the data diffi cult to 
read. Encryption should also minimize the risks of data being used ma-
liciously if the data falls into the wrong hands. The fact that we found 
the opposite effect can be explained if hospitals are less careful about 
controlling access internally to encrypted data, and also if employees 
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are less careful with computer equipment when they believe that data 
is encrypted. This research also highlighted the extent to which human 
error, rather than malicious external hackers, is responsible for data 
loss: Ponemon (2009) found that 88% of data breaches in 2008 could be 
traced back to insider negligence. Our research also emphasized that a 
commonly used policy tool for trying to promote data security may not 
be effective. In most instances we found little correlation between data 
loss and the enactment of data- breach notifi cation laws, which states 
have passed to force fi rms to notify customers about any data breaches.
Building on these fi ndings, we estimated jointly the likelihood of a 
data loss and the adoption of encryption software. As a source of exter-
nal variation that drives the adoption of encryption software but not the 
loss of data, we used whether or not the state’s  breach- notifi cation law 
makes an exception for encrypted data. Many states have enacted regu-
lations that require fi rms to notify customers if their data is breached. 
However, many of these states give a blanket exception or “safe harbor” 
if the breached data were encrypted. The underlying identifi cation ar-
gument is that a  state- wide encryption exception should give incremen-
tal incentives to hospitals in that state to adopt encryption software, 
compared to hospitals in states that do not have any such encryption 
exception. This increased incentive is not related to those hospitals’ 
underlying propensity to lose data. When we controlled for the endo-
geneity of the adoption of encryption software in this manner, adopt-
ing encryption software was still positively associated with a greater 
likelihood of data loss. We also showed that there was no such relative 
boost for states that give safe harbor to encrypted data but whose laws 
explicitly exclude hospitals from their laws. This offers reassurance that 
there is not something unobserved about the kind of states that put in 
exceptions to their data- breach notifi cation laws, which may also be as-
sociated with security technology adoption and data loss.
Of course, it is possible to argue that if the adoption of encryption 
software is associated with an increase in data loss, then this matters 
little if encryption makes the lost data useless. If only unreadable data 
are lost, it is not clear whether an increased likelihood of data loss poses 
a security risk to fi rms. However, there are three lingering concerns 
over the loss of encrypted data, which mean that the data loss may 
still harm fi rms. First, our fi nding that the adoption of encryption soft-
ware is associated with an increase in instances of fraud emphasizes 
that encryption software is not effective at preventing insiders from 
accessing readable data. For example, the fi nancial fi rm Countrywide 
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emphasizes their use of encryption and access controls in their website 
privacy and security policies. However, these encryption techniques 
were not enough to prevent a Countrywide employee from 2006 to 
2008 from downloading records on up to two million customers/pros-
pects to sell to mortgage brokers who wanted them for sales leads.8 
Second, even unintentional loss of encrypted data may not be harmless. 
When data are encrypted, users generally access the data either via a 
separate key on a USB drive or password. Getgen (2009) shows how 
easily keys can be lost or compromised. Their study showed that 8% 
of organizations (including those who have not had a security breach) 
experienced problems with a lost encryption key over the previous 
two years. Third, there are many instances where fi rms encrypt some 
data, but leave other data unencrypted, and instances when employees 
decrypt data and download it to laptops or other unsecured portable 
devices.
The fi ndings of the paper matter because government policies em-
phasize encryption as a solution to the data security problems engen-
dered by this new world that emphasizes the sharing of data. Ponemon 
(2009) suggested that 44% of companies who experienced a prior breach 
expanded their use of encryption technologies following a breach. Our 
results suggested a broader set of policies that encompass training and 
awareness programs, manual procedures and controls, and strong iden-
tity and  access- management deployments.
In particular, we want to highlight that exceptions or a “Safe Harbor” 
for encryption are at the heart of recent modifi cations to HIPAA. Safe 
Harbor is a provision to the Final Breach Notifi cation Rule that elimi-
nates the requirement for an organization to notify affected parties and 
the federal government in the event of an electronic personal health 
information data breach.9 To qualify, such data must be in a format that 
is unusable, unreadable, or indecipherable to unauthorized individuals 
(source: 74 FR 42740). In such cases, the  health- care organization is ex-
empted from having to pursue costly breach notifi cation. If ePHI (elec-
tronic protected health information) data is encrypted pursuant to this 
guidance, then no breach notifi cation is required following an imper-
missible use or disclosure of the information. The effi cacy of such laws 
has been under question since Romanosky, Telang, and Acquisti (2011) 
found only weak effects from  state- level data- breach notifi cation laws 
on the number of identity theft cases in that state. We emphasize that 
if federal or state laws give safe harbor to all encrypted data, this may 
lead fi rms to focus on encryption to the detriment of fi rm efforts that 
This content downloaded from 018.101.008.089 on March 04, 2019 08:44:11 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Frontiers of Health Policy: Digital Data and Personalized Medicine 61
are focused on controlling internal access to data and employee caution 
when managing personal data. In other words, by promoting a techno-
logical solution, and not  human- based fi rm processes that complement 
encryption’s effectiveness, giving a safe harbor to encrypted data may 
not have the intended effect.
C. Does Privacy Regulation Help or Hurt the Sharing of Patient Data?
Given the data- security risks, and the uneasiness many patients feel 
about unfettered access to their data by medical professionals, it is un-
surprising that, as well as regulations designed to enhance data secu-
rity, governments have also introduced regulations designed specifi -
cally to protect patients’ privacy.
The most prominent federal policy on health data privacy is HIPAA 
(the 1996 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act). The 
HIPAA Privacy Rule established national standards to protect medi-
cal records, whether paper or electronic. The rule requires safeguards 
to protect the privacy of personal health information, and sets limits 
and conditions on the uses and disclosures that may be made of such 
information without patient authorization. The rule also gives patients 
rights over their health information, including rights to examine and 
obtain a copy of their health records, and to request corrections. The 
rule was fi rst introduced in 2000. It was updated as a result of the 2009 
HITECH Act and the fi nal text was released in 2013, in a form that is 
stricter with larger fi nes for data breaches and more restrictions on the 
use of personal data, as well as expanding the coverage and number of 
fi rms and sectors that need to comply.
In addition to HIPAA there is also a patchwork of state privacy regu-
lations. The existence of this patchwork of state privacy regulations al-
lowed us to explore how  state- level privacy regulation affects the health 
technologies that allow the creation and sharing of patient data.
In our early paper, Miller and Tucker (2009), we examined how the 
presence or absence of state privacy regulation affected the adoption of 
digital records systems or EMRs by hospitals. As we have discussed, 
EMRs theoretically offer benefi ts that are automatic for the hospital re-
gardless of whether or what other hospitals adopt. These  stand- alone 
benefi ts include shorter hospital stays prompted by  better- coordinated 
care within the hospital, less nursing time spent on administrative 
tasks, and better use of medications in hospitals. However, EMRs also 
offers benefi ts that are contingent on other local hospitals also adopt-
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ing a technology that allows patient data to be shared across hospi-
tals. These allow hospitals to provide better care to patients who have 
chronic conditions and are seeing a new specialist, or are in emergency 
room situations where they cannot communicate medical history or al-
lergies (Brailer 2005). In certain circumstances the ability to access a pa-
tient’s medical fi le quickly and electronically can also lower  health- care 
costs, for example, if it avoids the need for duplicate tests.
We explored whether the presence of privacy regulation could affect 
whether these contingent benefi ts induce adoption of digital technol-
ogies by hospitals. This is, of course, related to the notion of network 
effects in economics—with that lens, this paper explored whether the 
presence of privacy regulation suppresses the network effects that 
might otherwise be inherent in a digital technology designed to share 
data. Our state law panel began in 1996, covering the great bulk of the 
relevant period of EMRs adoption. During that period, there were 19 
changes in laws: 4 changes to increase privacy protection and 15 to de-
crease it. In our empirical analysis we fi rst observed whether a hospital 
was located in a state with a privacy law covering hospitals.10 Hospitals 
in these states have explicit statutory requirements to protect the con-
fi dentiality of patient medical information, and are restricted in their 
ability to disclose such information to outside parties without express 
prior authorization from the patient. Hospitals in other states are not 
explicitly covered by state laws governing the privacy of medical infor-
mation. We studied the average effects of such laws and did not cali-
brate the substantial variations in the strength and content of these laws 
across states. In our empirical analysis, we used the adoption of EMRs 
at other neighboring hospitals in the local health service area (HSA) as 
a proxy for contingent benefi ts. The 815 health service areas are ideal 
for our purpose, as they were constructed as a self- contained area for 
patient fl ow (Makuc et al. 1991).11
Hospitals trade off these automatic and contingent benefi ts against 
potential costs that include the upfront costs of software and hard-
ware installation, training, ongoing maintenance, and physician resis-
tance (Groopman 2007). In our regression analysis, we controlled for 
 hospital- specifi c characteristics such as the number of fully staffed 
beds, organizational structure, and number of outpatients to capture 
variation in the  stand- alone benefi ts from EMRs using the relevant an-
nual data from the AHA. We found evidence that, indeed, there was 
an interaction between potential network effects and the presence of 
privacy regulation. In states without hospital privacy legislation, EMR 
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adoption by one hospital increased the probability of a neighboring 
hospital’s adoption by 7% overall by the end of the sample period.
We also looked at relative effects over time. In this data panel, we 
grouped the technology adoption data into three time periods, ending 
in 1999, 2002, and 2005, refl ecting the years of the privacy law data. In 
our regressions, we excluded hospitals who had previously adopted 
EMRs from our observations, though we included this adoption as 
an explanatory variable.12 In this specifi cation, we found that in states 
without hospital privacy legislation, EMR adoption by one hospital 
increased the probability of a neighboring hospital’s adoption by 2% 
every three years. However, and importantly, in states with hospital 
privacy protection, there was no measurable effect from one hospital 
adopting EMR on another hospital. We also tried to control for the fact 
that the enactment of privacy regulation is likely endogenous by in-
strumenting for the presence of privacy regulation using plausibly ex-
ogenous changes in the closeness of the composition of the state house 
and senate, and measured similarly large effects. Furthermore, we also 
found evidence that  state- level privacy protections functionally lead to 
hospitals to choose systems that are incompatible with easy data shar-
ing. These results are unpublished, but given the current policy empha-
sis on compatibility and the emphasis of this chapter on the importance 
of data sharing, it seems worth discussing them here.
To establish this result, we used the same data and approach as Miller 
and Tucker (2014a) to study how state privacy protection affects hospi-
tal choices over the interoperability of the software they buy. We used 
 cross- state and time- series variation in state privacy protection to quan-
tify the interaction between the presence of state privacy protection and 
whether a hospital chooses to install an EMR system that is interoper-
able with other hospitals in the local health service area.
When hospitals buy EMRs from different vendors, the systems may 
be incompatible if they use different data formats. Therefore, sharing 
information electronically becomes cumbersome and expensive if two 
hospitals’ EMRs software is not easily interoperable. We gathered in-
formation on interoperability from the IHE project, which promotes the 
coordinated use of established standards such as DICOM and HL7 to 
record information about patient care. The IHE project was an early 
global initiative that was set up with the aim of promoting the pass-
ing of health information seamlessly across multiple  health- care enter-
prises. It does not establish new standards, but instead aims to promote 
the adoption of existing standards in order to promote interoperability. 
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As of 2006, there were seven vendors who had made explicit “integra-
tion statements.” These statements are documents prepared and pub-
lished by vendors to describe the intended conformity of their prod-
ucts with the IHE Technical Framework. The documents then set out 
how each EMR system conforms to broadly used standards such as 
HL7, DICOM, or WS3. The vendors that had made such statements are 
Cerner Corporation, GE Healthcare, IDX, McKesson Provider Technol-
ogies, Philips Medical Systems, and Siemens Medical Solutions.13 We 
categorized hospital technology purchases into interoperable and less 
interoperable systems by whether they had purchased software from 
one of these vendors who had made a public statement that laid out 
their commitment toward integration, or from another vendor that had 
made no such commitment.
We studied whether a hospital located in a HSA where many other 
hospitals have chosen easily interoperable systems is more likely to 
also choose an easily interoperable system if there is no strong state 
law relating to patient privacy protection. Our underlying hypothesis 
is that privacy protection diminishes the size of potential benefi ts from 
the transfer of patient information that are contingent on adoption by 
other hospitals. Therefore, privacy protection should diminish the rela-
tive importance of installing an EMR system that is easily interoperable 
with other hospitals. Correspondingly, privacy protection may imply 
that hospitals will be less deterred from choosing a system that is not 
easily interoperable, even if other nearby hospitals have easily interop-
erable systems. While common unobservable factors can provide an 
alternative explanation for correlated adoption by vendor type, they 
cannot explain differences in responsiveness to different kinds of adop-
tion by neighboring hospitals in the HSA by the status of state privacy 
protection.
We found that hospitals in states with privacy laws are twice as likely 
to adopt less easily interoperable systems. Hospitals in states with pri-
vacy laws are also less likely to adopt systems that are more interoper-
able with the systems already adopted by nearby hospitals. This sug-
gests that  state- level privacy protection is associated with US hospitals 
adopting EMRs that are less interoperable with each other.
Therefore, there is quantitative evidence that the enactment of state 
privacy protection reduces the responsiveness of electronic medical 
records adoption to the size and interoperability of the EMR systems 
chosen by neighboring hospitals in the local HSA. When states restrict 
medical providers’ ability to disclose information, hospitals are less 
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likely to choose systems that are interoperable with other neighboring 
hospitals in the HSA. As such, privacy regulation may not only hinder 
technology adoption, but it may also hinder the adoption of technol-
ogies that are compatible with each other and allow data fl ows in the 
future. We emphasize that while using established standards is a neces-
sary condition for the exchange of information, it is not a suffi cient con-
dition. Indeed, there are frequently incompatibilities even within dif-
ferent versions of the same system that use exactly the same standards, 
especially when issues of identifi cation, security, and versioning arise.
Though there are many good reasons for states to enact privacy pro-
tection, our results suggest that those protections may encourage hospi-
tals to be less likely to adopt digital technologies, and if they do adopt, 
to be more likely to adopt less interoperable EMRs.
III.  Potential Positive Consequences of Personalized Data 
and Medicine
So far this chapter has focused on the potential benefi ts and policy con-
sequences of the sharing of data. We now turn to consider the potential 
benefi ts and also the policy consequences of the deepening of data. We 
start this discussion by highlighting what we believe will be one of the 
most profound changes in the nature of data use and storage surround-
ing patient care, which is the potential use of genomic data to enhance 
patient care. The use of genomic data is often highlighted as being at 
the forefront of personalized medicine.
Personalized medicine, where patients receive individually tailored 
health treatment based on their unique genetic makeup, promises to 
revolutionize health care. Clinical applications of genetic information 
can improve public health and medical care productivity by targeting 
preventive care and interventions where they are most effective.14 The 
desirability of personalized medicine stems both from the fact that per-
sonal genetic information may one day be used by individuals to antici-
pate their disease risks, select investment in preventive care, and when 
facing illness, to select the most effective treatment, but there are also 
potentially large  system- wide gains from analyzing personal genetic 
data on a large scale.
Currently, the usefulness of genetic testing for general purposes is 
questioned due to diffi culty in identifying solid statistical correlations 
and questions over the usefulness of such results for the average pa-
tient (Evans, Skrzynia, and Burke 2001). However, genetic tests can be 
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extremely valuable to individuals in certain subpopulations. Genetic 
variations have been identifi ed that predict increased risks of breast 
cancer, ovarian cancer, colon cancer, and cystic fi brosis, among other 
diseases. A negative result would imply a normal cancer risk, while a 
positive result would be elevated.
For example, the offi cial guidance for someone who has tested posi-
tive for the BRCA or BRCA2 mutation, which elevates the risk of breast 
or ovarian cancer, is that they should be offered “enhanced screening” 
to try and detect breast cancer at an early stage.15 It also suggests they 
should be offered prophylactic surgery, which removes as much “at- 
risk” tissue as possible; this may involve a double mastectomy and the 
removal of ovaries and fallopian tubes. There is also the possibility of 
“chemoprevention,” which is the use of drugs such as tamoxifen and 
raloxifene to try and reduce the risk of cancer. Though medical evi-
dence is at an early stage on the effectiveness of such actions, there is 
evidence that taking these aggressive measures can greatly reduce the 
incidence of cancer. For example, studies suggest that tamoxifen can cut 
breast cancer incidence among healthy BRCA2 carriers by 62% (King 
et al. 2001). A double mastectomy can reduce breast cancer incidence by 
90% (Hartmann et al. 2001).
IV.  Potential Policy Consequences of Personalized Data 
and Medicine
A. Privacy Concerns Raised by Personalized Data and Medicine
As with the sharing of data, with the increased deepening and per-
sonalization of data there are natural privacy concerns. Therefore, the 
spread of potentially revolutionary genetic tests that form the basis of 
customized medicine may be stymied by privacy concerns.16
However, we would argue that there are privacy concerns connected 
with  genetic- testing data that go beyond those potentially of “regular” 
health data.
First, the creation of a genetic record is permanent in a world of per-
sistent digital data. However, at this time in 2016, the consequences of 
such data in the future are uncertain, as is the speed at which the ability 
to project out health outcomes accurately from the human genome will 
develop. At the same time, as more links are uncovered between genes 
and personality traits and future health risks, individuals may suffer 
from discrimination or other harms from having parts of their genetic 
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information revealed to others.17 Second, there are potential spillovers 
of the creation of this data for family members. For example, if someone 
through a genetic test is found likely to be carrying a BRCA1 or BRCA2 
mutation, this changes the expected probability distribution for her rel-
atives also having that mutation. Third, genetic data is almost unique in 
the extent to which it is immutable. It is a piece of data about a person 
that cannot be changed. While in theory an individual can improve his 
or her credit record by more judicious use of credit cards, or potentially 
improve a health record by quitting smoking, for example, it is impos-
sible to improve or enhance or change data from a genetic test.
In Miller and Tucker (2014b), we studied the effects of privacy regula-
tions that are designed to protect genetic privacy on the diffusion of per-
sonalized medicine. Strong privacy protection may increase the value of 
genetic testing to consumers because it assures that they will not suffer 
harm in future market interactions. However, privacy protection may 
sensitize consumers to privacy concerns, increase costs to providers of 
 genetic- testing services, and reduce the value to insurance companies 
of covering the service. This makes the empirical effect ambiguous. Fur-
ther, since privacy protection is not a binary, all- or- nothing choice, it is 
important to understand which features of privacy regulations are most 
benefi cial from the view of consumers and which are most costly to 
producers. The study therefore explored the different provisions within 
privacy laws to identify policies that are most favorable to the spread of 
personalized medicine. We used variation in state laws over time in the 
United States to estimate the effect of different kinds of genetic privacy 
laws on the use of genetic testing for cancer risks.
State genetic privacy laws, at a high level of generality, take three 
alternate approaches to protecting patient privacy: fi rst, requiring in-
formed consent on the part of the individual; second, explicitly restrict-
ing the use of genetic data by health insurance, employers, or providers 
of long- term life care or insurance; and third, limiting redisclosure with-
out the consent of the individual or defi ning genetic data as the “prop-
erty” of the individual. Using  individual- level panel data, we found 
that an approach that gives users control over redisclosure encouraged 
the spread of genetic testing, whereas an approach of informed consent 
deterred individuals from obtaining genetic tests. We found no effects 
of antidiscrimination rules that limit the use of genetic information in 
particular contexts. We summarize these results graphically in fi gure 1.
 We also showed that there were no similar effects of genetic privacy 
protection on nongenetic opt- in health testing (for HIV status) or use 
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of preventive health care (getting a fl u shot). We found larger effects 
for patients where the potential risks of genetic data being misused are 
highest, such as those who already know they have an elevated risk 
due to a family history of cancer (and individuals who show greater 
concern for their health privacy in other ways), but no effects for in-
dividuals who have already received a cancer diagnosis for one of the 
types predicted by genetic testing (breast, ovarian, colon, or rectal). We 
showed that the magnitude of the effect of the laws is driven by that 
individual’s stated privacy concerns.
We then evaluated whether these results were driven by individual 
responses to privacy concerns, or by underlying changes in  supply- side 
testing availability due to the laws. Genetic consent laws appear to re-
duce testing availability, suggesting that part of their negative effect 
stems from costs that complying with consent requirements impose on 
hospitals. However, there was no positive effect on  genetic- testing avail-
ability as a result of redisclosure laws, suggesting that particular kind of 
law derives its positive effect from its ability to provide  consumer- side 
reassurance.
One unexpected part of this research was our fi nding that insurance 
type was not signifi cantly related to the decision to have a genetic test. 
This was surprising, given the emphasis in the economic literature on 
the effects of genetic testing on insurance markets, such as Oster et al. 
(2010).18 In general, our results in this paper were suggestive about the 
Fig. 1. Summary of results of effects of different types of genetic privacy regulation on 
genetic testing.
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consequences of alternative approaches to regulating genetic privacy, 
given the perceived desirability of personalized medicine.
Public health and consumer advocates have argued for strong genetic 
privacy protections (Gostin 1991). However, life insurance industry rep-
resentatives have argued that all genetic information from applicants 
should be made available to them and that genetic insurance might be a 
viable solution (McEwen, McCarty, and Reilly 1993). By measuring the 
effects of genetic privacy on  genetic- testing rates and availability, this 
research provided the fi rst empirical evidence on how public policy re-
lated to privacy affects the diffusion of genetic medicine. Generally, the 
empirical literature on privacy regulation has documented largely nega-
tive effects of privacy regulation for the spread and use of data- enriched 
technologies, both in health care and elsewhere (Goldfarb and Tucker 
2011, 2012). This research emphasized how different features of privacy 
regulation, in particular those that emphasize rights over data, can have 
different effects from more commonly found consent requirements, 
which previous studies found to be associated with negative effects.
B. Is Genetic Data for Personalized Medicine Different?
This paper also provided some of the fi rst empirical evidence about 
“genetic exceptionalism.” There has been substantial policy debate 
about whether genetic health data are distinct and different from regu-
lar health data and therefore needs a special class of protection (Yesley 
1998).19 Genetic information can reveal more than a person’s current 
health status; it contains information about their future health risks and 
traits that are unrelated to disease (Savitz and Ramesar 2004). These 
concerns, specifi c to genetic (or genomic) information, can complicate 
the legal and ethical issues surrounding disclosure of personal informa-
tion (Berry 1997), and are the motivation for the new, targeted laws. Re-
fl ecting this, the new genetic privacy regulations that we studied were 
explicitly incremental to existing state and federal laws protecting the 
privacy of personal health information.20
Our paper (Miller and Tucker 2014b) provided the fi rst empirical 
evidence on how individual behavior responds to regulations that pro-
tect the privacy of genetic information rather than general health data. 
Our fi nding that genetic privacy laws have distinct effects above and 
beyond standard health data privacy laws provides some support for 
separate legislative action. To be clear, we did not argue that genetic 
data are different in function or from a medical perspective. Instead, 
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we emphasized that, from a patient’s perspective, genetic information 
is regarded as something different that needs its own protections.
V. Beyond Health Care
Much of this chapter has focused on the implications for the provision 
of health care of the shift toward digital data. However, in our conclud-
ing remarks, we want to emphasize that, though we focus on how the 
sharing and deepening of individual patient data is an impetus for new 
policy emphasis in health care, the  health- care sector also provides a 
useful barometer for policy considerations in other data- driven parts 
of the economy.
There are two dimensions behind this observation. First, health care 
provides an unusually rich setting for empirical studies about the likely 
consequences of different types of policies for data- enhanced industries. 
Since health care is regulated at both the federal and state level, this can 
provide useful variation in policy approaches for empirical research-
ers to study. Furthermore, the availability and comprehensive nature 
of data in the  health- care sector only enhances its appeal—we know of 
no other sector where there is an industry body such as the Healthcare 
Information and Management Systems Society (HIMSS) dedicated to 
collecting such detailed information about the current state of IT adop-
tion by  health- care providers. Indeed, in our own work, we have often 
documented the effects of policies surrounding data such as privacy 
protection in health care fi rst, and then found that they are replicated 
in other sectors.21
Second, health care is also unusual in terms of how high the stakes are 
of getting policy right. Currently, the United States spends more than 
any other developed country on health care, yet receives worse health 
outcomes (Bradley and Taylor 2013). Furthermore, the potential conse-
quences of policies toward ensuring that the upside of data sharing and 
deepening are felt and the risks are minimized are large in this sector. 
We would argue that the “high stakes” of data in this sector, however, 
are the reason why policy in this area needs to quicker and more re-
sponsive than other sectors, even potentially providing leadership and 
guidance to other sectors about appropriate policy approaches.
Endnotes
Catherine Tucker thanks NSF Career Award 6923256 for research funding. All mistakes 
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authors’ material fi nancial relationships, if any, please see http:// www .nber .org /chapters 
/c13760 .ack.
1. We also acknowledge that beyond the direct clinical advantages, healthcare IT can 
improve quality through improved measurement and data aggregation, which are vital 
elements of national programs to assess hospital quality (Jha et al. 2006) or to design ap-
propriate  performance- based incentives.
2. We used technology data from the 2005 release of the Healthcare Information and 
Management Systems Society (HIMSS) AnalyticsTM Database (HADB). This database uses 
annual surveys to record the state of technology adoption for US hospitals who are part 
of HIMSS. These hospitals tended to be more urban and larger than the hospitals that we 
did not have technology adoption data for, refl ecting the membership of HIMSS.
3. For more historical and policy background on the “meaningful use” criteria, 
see Blumenthal and Tavenner (2010), Jha (2010), and Adler- Milstein, Bates, and Jha 
(2011).
4. http:// www .cms .gov /EHRIncentivePrograms /Downloads /13 _Electronic 
_Exchange _of _Clinical _Information .pdf.
5. http:// www .hiewatch .com /news /3 - ways - make - health - data - and - hie - public - good.
6. https:// www .healthit .gov /sites /default /fi les /reports /info _blocking _040915 .pdf.
7. The emphasis on data sharing is shared by industry leaders and consumer advocates 
(Clark 2009). Jim Lott, executive vice president, Hospital Council of Southern California: 
“Looking for savings in hospitals that use EMRs is  short- sighted. The real payday for use 
of EMRs will come with interoperability. Measurable savings will be realized as middle-
ware is installed that will allow for the electronic transmission and translation of patient 
records across different proprietary systems between delivery networks.” Johnny Walker, 
founder and past CEO of Patient Safety Institute: “EMRs don’t save money in standalone 
situations. However, EMRs will absolutely save signifi cant money (and improve care and 
safety) when connected and sharing clinical information.”
8. “Security Oversight May Have Enabled Countrywide Breach,” Nancy Gohring, IDG 
News Service, 08- 04- 2008.
9. See https:// hipaacentral .com /Documents /Perspectives /HIPAA - Encryption 
- Requirements - Perspective .aspx.
10. Data on privacy laws from Pritts et al. (2002), Pritts et al. (1999), and Gostin, Laz-
zarini, and Flaherty (1996).
11. Our fi ndings in this paper might seem at odds with the fi ndings of Miller and 
Tucker (2014a) that hospitals in large systems often dislike sharing data with competitors. 
We emphasize that these empirical results, which suggest that privacy regulation inhibits 
adoption through the mechanism of inhibiting network effects, did not distinguish be-
tween attempts to share data within hospital systems and attempts to share data outside 
of hospital systems, but instead just looks at a geographical area. And, often hospitals 
within the same system are co- located.
12. Adoption decisions before 1996 were not studied in the panel framework, but were 
included as explanatory variables. Divestiture of an EMRs system is rare—only 2.4% of 
EMRs were replaced. We assumed that hospitals only considered past adoption and did 
not use forecasts of future adoption in their decisions.
13. As listed by http:// www .ihe .net /resources /ihe _integration _statements .cfm in July 
2006.
14. The potential value of personalized medicine is refl ected in President Obama’s Pre-
cision Medicine Initiative, announced in his 2015 State of the Union Address, to which 
his 2016 budget allocates $215 million. See http:// www .whitehouse .gov /the - press - offi ce 
/2015 /01 /30 /fact - sheet - president - obama - s - precision - medicine - initiative.
15. http:// www .cancer .gov /cancertopics /factsheet /Risk /BRCA.
16. Indeed, for the case of cancer risks where genetic links are well established, and for 
high- risk populations where genetic testing is therefore most valuable, rates of adoption 
remain low. Data from the 2010 National Health Interview Survey suggest that, even 
among individuals who have been advised by their physician to obtain a genetic test for 
cancer, over 30% do not comply.
17. Komarova, Nekipelov, and Yakovlev (2013) emphasize the ability of fi rms to com-
bine multiple different types of public data to identify allegedly anonymous profi les.
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18. Oster, Shoulson, and Dorsey (2013) discuss a possible psychological motivation 
for individuals with elevated risks for Huntington’s disease to decline genetic testing; 
namely, that a positive result limits their ability to maintain optimistic beliefs about their 
true risk.
19. With respect to privacy, Washington is the only state that explicitly treats genetic 
information the same as other health information by including genetic information in the 
defi nition of  health- care information under the state health privacy law.
20. Generally, the focus of these laws have been on data privacy rather than data secu-
rity; see Miller and Tucker (2011b) for a description of the role of data- breach notifi cation 
laws on the spread of information technology in health care.
21. See Goldfarb and Tucker (2012) for a discussion of the parallels of our work on 
privacy regulation in health care and in other sectors.
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